环境经济与环境管理
林高松,李适宇,李娟.基于群决策的河流允许排污量公平分配博弈模型[J].环境科学学报,2009,29(9):2010-2016
基于群决策的河流允许排污量公平分配博弈模型
- A game theory model for allocation of river waste load based on group decision making
- 基金项目：广东省“科技计划百项工程”项目(No.4202112)
- 作者
- 单位
- 林高松
- 1. 中山大学环境科学与工程学院, 广州 510275; 2. 深圳市环境科学研究院, 深圳 518001
- 李适宇
- 中山大学环境科学与工程学院, 广州 510275
- 李娟
- 1. 中山大学环境科学与工程学院, 广州 510275; 2. 深圳市环境科学研究院, 深圳 518001
- 摘要：为解决河流水质管理中允许排污量的公平分配问题,建立一个由排污者群体决策的博弈模型.其基本原理是在现有被普遍接受的公平分配准则基础上,排污者按照一定的顺序,根据个体利益最大化原则依次选择分配准则并获得相应的允许排污量,同时考虑所有排序方式,求取平均值作为最终分配结果.案例研究结果表明,模型综合考虑了多种分配准则,无需人为给定准则的权重,保证了分配依据和分配过程的公正,由排污者群体决策而得出最终结果,是一种较为公平合理的允许排污量分配方法.模型求解与博弈论的Shapley解法类似,计算量呈随排污者个数阶乘递增趋势.
- Abstract：A game theory model for equitable waste load allocation for river quality management is proposed. On the basis of equitable allocation rules which are widely accepted,polluters choose the rules they prefer in a certain order,then they receive a corresponding waste load quota as their profit. All permutations and combinations are calculated,and the average of their profits in different order is taken as the ultimate scheme for waste load allocation. A case study with a hypothetical river basin including three cities as polluters was conducted. The results show that this model takes into account all waste load allocation rules supported by different polluters and it avoids giving weight to the rules artificially. The impartiality of rules and procedures for waste load allocation are guaranteed in the process of decision-making. The ultimate scheme is obtained by fair competition among the polluters. The model provides a reasonable and equitable method for waste load allocation in a river system shared by multiple cities or polluters. The solution of the model is similar to the Shapley value for cooperative games,in which the computational time is the factorial of the polluter number.
摘要点击次数： 2598 全文下载次数： 2526
